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Influenza pandemics arise when antigenically 
novel influenza viruses enter and spread exten-
sively in the human population. By this definition, 
there have been five influenza pandemics in the 
last 100 years, the worst of which cost 50 million 
lives worldwide (Johnson and Mueller, 2002). 
Of these pandemics, three likely arose from the 
introduction of genes from avian viruses into the 
human population (1918—H1N1, 1957—H2N2, 
1968—H3N2 (dos Reis et al., 2009; Neumann 
et al., 2009, Worobey et al., 2014)), one arose 
from the introduction of a swine virus (2009—
H1N1 (Smith et al., 2009)), and one was likely 
due to the unintended reintroduction of a previ-
ously widespread human virus that had not been 
seen in humans for two decades (1977—H1N1 
(dos Reis et al., 2009, Nakajima et al., 1978, 
Palese, 2004)). However, the viruses responsible 
for these pandemics represent only a tiny fraction 
of the total diversity of influenza A viruses that 
exist in nature (Webster et al., 1992). Assessing 
which viruses pose the greatest risk of causing the 
next human pandemic is an enormous challenge.
Pandemic influenza risk assessment faces a 
fundamental problem: a paucity of empirical data 
on the differences between pandemic viruses 
and their immediate ancestors from non-human 
hosts. The challenge was clearly articulated by 
Harvey Fineberg in his analysis of the US gov-
ernment's response to the 1976 swine influenza 
scare (Fineberg, 2009): ‘The first lesson is to 
avoid over-confidence about scientific insights. 
Major flu pandemics arise on average only about 
three times every century, which means scien-
tists can make relatively few direct observations 
in each lifetime and have a long time to think 
about each observation. That is a circumstance 
that is ripe for over-interpretation.’
Core elements of current approaches to pan-
demic preparedness and mitigation, such as 
the development of vaccines and stockpiling of 
antiviral drugs, require detailed virological and 
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immunological data on viruses with perceived 
pandemic potential and ample lead time for pro-
duction (Jennings et al., 2008, Keitel and Piedra, 
2014). The substantial diversity of known influenza 
viruses in non-human hosts, and the frequent iden-
tification of new viruses, makes extensive exper-
imental testing and development of pandemic 
preparedness measures against all viruses unfea-
sible. Thus, there is a need for continuing attempts 
to assess the pandemic risks posed by non-human 
viruses in order to prioritize viruses of concern 
for pandemic preparedness planning. Currently, 
influenza pandemic risk assessment is largely 
driven by a simple idea: animal viruses that cause 
sporadic human infections are thought to pose a 
greater pandemic risk than viruses that have not 
been documented to infect humans (Figure 1). 
This intuitively attractive idea does not have direct 
empirical support, as none of the viruses that 
caused the 1918, 1957, 1968, or 2009 pandemics 
was detected in humans before they emerged in 
their pandemic form (Smith et al., 2009). This is 
largely due to a lack of surveillance (1918, 1957, 
and 1968 pandemics) and to the mistaken assump-
tion that virus subtypes already circulating in 
humans were unlikely to cause pandemics (2009 
pandemic) (Peiris et al., 2012). However, increased 
surveillance has probably improved the chance 
that the next pandemic virus will be identified 
prior to sustained human-to-human transmission.
If it is true that influenza surveillance has the 
possibility of identifying potential pandemic viruses 
before they begin to spread extensively between 
humans, then improving the basis for assessment 
of the risks posed by those viruses is an important 
goal. The level of public health concern about 
identified non-human influenza viruses should be 
a function of the potential of each virus to gain 
the ability to transmit efficiently from human to 
human and the severity of disease that such a 
virus would cause should it become pandemic. 
These two high-level phenotypes are each deter-
mined by the interaction of a number of biochem-
ical traits of the virus during human infection 
(Figure 2) (Chou et al., 2011, Hatta et al., 2001, 
Kobasa et al., 2004, Labadie et al., 2007, Yen 
et al., 2011), the state of immunity to that influ-
enza virus in human populations at the time of 
emergence (Miller et al., 2010, Xu et al., 2010), 
and by environmental factors such as tempera-
ture and humidity (Shaman et al., 2011).
Currently, the primary tool that uses multiple 
data streams for assessing pandemic risk is the 
Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT) (Cox et al., 
2014, Trock et al., 2012). The IRAT integrates 
existing knowledge, including information on virus 
transmissibility and disease severity, with expert 
opinion about potential pandemic viruses to 
assign relative risk scores to those viruses. The IRAT 
is useful for identifying key gaps in knowledge, 
Figure 1. Evidence for concern and actions to mitigate influenza pandemics. Types of evidence that have been, or could be, used to justify specific 
preparedness or mitigation actions prior to evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission, largely based on the authors' interpretation of national 
and international responses to H5N1, H7N9, and H3N2v outbreaks (Epperson et al., 2013, WHO, 2011). Red indicates largely sufficient, orange partly 
sufficient, yellow minimally sufficient, gray insufficient. * high pathogenicity phenotype as defined by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
(OIE, 2013).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883.002
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focusing risk management efforts, and pro-
viding clear documentation of decision ration-
ales. However, to be used optimally, the IRAT 
requires a substantial amount of experimental 
data about virus phenotypes including information 
on receptor binding, transmissibility in laboratory 
animals, and antiviral treatment susceptibility. 
In the absence of phenotype data, preliminary 
assessments with the IRAT must rely on extrapo-
lations from related viruses, which are prone to 
subjective interpretation.
The biochemical traits that determine virus 
phenotypes are themselves determined by the 
genetic sequence of the virus (Figure 2). In theory, 
it might eventually be possible to predict virus 
phenotype directly from virus sequence data. 
However, the complexities of the relationships 
between sequences and traits and from traits to 
disease phenotypes, make the prediction of pan-
demic potential from genomic sequence a tre-
mendous challenge. Here, we discuss ways in 
which laboratory experiments, together with com-
putational and theoretical developments, could 
improve genotype-to-phenotype prediction and, 
in conjunction with enhanced surveillance, improve 
assessment of the risks posed to humans by non-
human influenza viruses.
Experimental approaches
One goal of experimental studies on non-human 
influenza viruses is to identify general virus traits 
that are likely to affect transmissibility between 
humans, and then relate those traits to specific 
virus sequence changes. For obvious reasons, direct 
experimental assessment of human-to-human 
transmission of potential pandemic viruses is 
not feasible. However, influenza viruses that have 
caused pandemics in humans have been shown 
to transmit efficiently in animal models (most 
commonly ferrets) (Chou et al., 2011, Yen et al., 
2011), thus animal models are thought to be 
useful for examining the genetic changes in viruses 
that facilitate human-to-human transmission. For 
example, several studies have shown that genetic 
changes in the neuraminidase (NA) and matrix 
(M) gene segments acquired by the virus lineage 
responsible for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic increased 
transmissibility in animal models (Chou et al., 2011, 
Lakdawala et al., 2011, Yen et al., 2011), sug-
gesting that these changes may have played a 
role in enhancing the virus's transmissibility in 
humans and hence paved the way for pandemic 
emergence. When animal experiments provide 
quantitative measures of virus traits, these can 
be integrated into quantitative measures of risk 
assessment such as the IRAT (Trock et al., 2012).
Recently, several high-profile and controver-
sial gain-of-function (GoF) studies have attempted 
to go beyond the characterization of existing 
viruses to prospectively identify new mutations 
in avian H5N1 viruses that enhance the ability of 
these viruses to transmit between ferrets by the 
airborne route (Chen et al., 2012, Herfst et al., 
2012, Imai et al., 2012, Zhang et al., 2013). 
Important questions about the relative risks and 
benefits of these studies have been debated exten-
sively elsewhere (Fauci, 2012; Fouchier et al., 
2013; Lipkin, 2012; Casadevall and Imperiale, 
2014; Lipsitch and Galvani, 2014); here, we focus 
on scientific considerations.
Figure 2. Schematic of potential relationships from virus genetic sequence to level of public health concern/pandemic risk. Pandemic risk is a combina-
tion of the probability that a virus will cause a pandemic and the human morbidity and mortality that might result from that pandemic. Arrows represent 
possible relationships between levels and are not intended to summarize current knowledge.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883.003
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Because of the vast size of genetic space, such 
studies cannot possibly delineate all genetic vari-
ants of a virus that might be transmissible—after 
all, there are more than 1018 different possible 
five-mutation variants of any given hemagglu-
tinin (HA), which is more than what can reason-
ably be assayed experimentally and the vast 
majority will not facilitate transmissibility. A more 
modest goal is to attempt to associate classes of 
genetic or phenotypic traits with transmissibility. 
Transmissibility traits identified by GoF studies 
to date include some that were already known 
(such as switching receptor binding from avian-
like α2,3 sialic acid to human-like α2,6 sialic acid 
linkages (Yamada et al., 2006) and lowering 
the optimal temperature for viral polymerase 
activity (Massin et al., 2001)), as well as some 
that are new, such as increasing HA stability and 
reducing glycosylation on HA's globular head 
(Herfst et al., 2012, Imai et al., 2012). Whether 
these traits are either necessary or sufficient for 
transmissibility among humans or even other 
mammalian animal models remains unclear. For 
example, a recent study of an avian H5N1 virus 
found that by reassorting its internal genes with 
those of a 2009 pandemic virus, the virus could 
be rendered transmissible in guinea pigs (which 
have both α2,6 and α2,3 sialic acid in the upper 
respiratory tract) despite retaining a preference 
for binding α2,3 sialic acid. However, when muta-
tions identified in earlier ferret GoF experiments 
were used to switch the receptor specificity to 
α2,6 sialic acid, transmissibility was lost (Zhang 
et al., 2013).
A key question for efforts to assess pandemic 
risk of non-human viruses is the degree to which 
certain substitutions are general markers for a 
phenotype, or whether the impacts of those muta-
tions are dependent on genetic context and/or 
specific non-human host. Some mutations have 
been shown to be strong markers for pheno-
type for well-defined collections of viruses—for 
instance, the NA mutation H275Y consistently 
confers oseltamivir resistance on N1 neuramini-
dases (although the impact of the mutation on 
surface expression of NA, and thus virus fitness, 
varies dramatically) (Baz et al., 2010, Bloom 
et al., 2010). Similarly, the PB2 E627K substitu-
tion adapts the viral polymerase to mammalian 
cells in some viruses (Long et al., 2013) but not 
others (Herfst et al., 2010), while other viruses 
have adapted to mammals via different substi-
tutions in PB2 (Jagger et al., 2010, Mehle and 
Doudna, 2009; Zhu et al., 2010). In many cases, 
the effect of mutations can be highly sensitive 
to genetic context—for instance, the effects of 
cytotoxic T-lymphocyte escape mutations on 
nucleoprotein (NP) function depend on the sta-
bility of the parent protein, which can be affected 
by at least dozens of other mutations (Gong 
et al., 2013). Similar patterns of context depend-
ence have recently been shown for receptor 
binding specificity substitutions in H5N1 viruses 
(Tharakaraman et al., 2013). Therefore, even 
when phenotypic traits of interest can be identi-
fied, clear genetic markers for these traits are 
only present in some cases.
The utility of experimental studies for inform-
ing surveillance for higher-risk viruses hinges on 
the question of whether virus traits associated 
with risk of infection and transmission in humans 
possess clear genetic markers. If a trait only arises 
from a limited number of specific mutations or 
combination of mutations, then experimentally 
delineating these mutations would be helpful 
for surveillance. For these cases, it is important 
and useful for the community to have access to 
collections of interpretable genotype to pheno-
type traits such as in the H5N1 genetic changes 
inventory (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h5n1-
genetic-changes.htm) as well as computational 
tools to quickly connect new sequences to the 
body of available mutation annotation knowledge 
(FluSurver: http://flusurver.bii.a-star.edu.sg/). On 
the other hand, if a trait can be conferred by a 
large number of different mutations or combi-
nations of mutations, then it will be less effec-
tive to monitor specific mutations. In such cases, 
it may be more beneficial to focus on the broader 
biochemical properties of viruses or their pro-
teins. Developing laboratory capacity for rapid 
phenotype assessment would therefore be a val-
uable complement to high-throughput sequenc-
ing of new viruses. Moving forwards, if such 
biochemical traits can be clearly delineated and 
reliably modeled, then computational simulation 
of proteins could be used to predict phenotype 
from sequence, even for sequences from viruses 
that have never been experimentally tested.
Computational predictions
Computational methods present an attractive 
adjunct to experimental studies because they 
have higher throughput, have shorter turnaround 
times, are cheaper, and are safer than experi-
mental work with whole virulent viruses. The main 
drawback of computational methods is the largely 
unknown accuracy of their predictions—a draw-
back that is exacerbated by the lack of an estab-
lished framework for validating the accuracy of 
the numerous computational prediction methods 
that populate the literature.
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The elements of influenza pandemic risk assess-
ment that are most amenable to computational 
prediction are those that correspond to well-
defined, quantifiable molecular-scale traits such 
as receptor-binding preference, antiviral suscep-
tibility, antigenicity of HA and NA, and possibly 
T-cell epitopes. Higher-level phenotypes such as 
transmissibility, that integrate phenomena at a 
range of scales, are not yet sufficiently well under-
stood to be reasonable targets for computational 
predictions. A variety of computational methods 
shows promise for genotype-to-phenotype pre-
diction including molecular dynamics simula-
tions that combine high- and low-fidelity models 
(Amaro et al., 2009) and statistical learning 
approaches that use protein structure, dynamics, 
and sequence data to predict the phenotypic 
consequences of mutation (Kasson et al., 2009). 
However, better prospective validation of these 
tools against experimental data, particularly for 
exploring context dependency of genetic changes, 
is essential before these tools can be reliably used 
for informing public health decisions or policy-
making (Figure 1).
Making substantial progress in the develop-
ment of computational tools and the assess-
ment of their accuracy will require collaboration 
between experimental and computational scien-
tists to produce consistent testing and validation 
data. One possible mechanism to spur cooper-
ation would be a series of regular community 
assessment exercises similar to Critical Assessment 
of protein Structure Prediction (CASP) (Moult 
et al., 2011). In a CASP-like exercise, one or more 
experimental groups would generate quantita-
tive phenotype data for a set of viruses, for exam-
ple the relative binding of α2,3-sialoglycans and 
α2,6-sialoglycans, pH profile of viral activation, or 
sensitivity to oseltamivir, and challenge computa-
tional groups to predict that virus phenotype 
data from the genetic sequences of the viruses 
tested. The quantitative experimental data would 
be held under embargo while the exercise runs. 
Computational groups would complete predic-
tions for these targets, the experimental data set 
would then be released, and a meeting would be 
held to assess the performance of different meth-
ods to define avenues for improvement.
Ideal experimental data sets for CASP-like 
exercises include thermophoretic or interfero-
metric measurements of HA binding affinities to 
α2,3- and α2,6-sialoglycans (Xiong et al., 2013) 
and multi-method characterizations of viral pH 
activation shifts for sets of point mutants in HA 
(Galloway et al., 2013, Thoennes et al., 2008). 
Reliable computational prediction of biochemical 
traits from genetic data would be a major accom-
plishment. However, it should be recognized that 
further major developments, particularly com-
putational prediction of total virus fitness in new 
hosts, would still be required for realizing the 
utility of computational tools in policymaking.
Evolutionary theory and modeling
In addition to the genotype–phenotype rela-
tionship itself, there is a need for better under-
standing of the evolutionary mechanisms and 
pathways that allow adaptive mutations control-
ling host range to appear and rise in frequency. 
These mechanisms act in reservoir hosts, in inter-
mediate hosts (if any), and in humans or other 
potential hosts; they also act at multiple scales, as 
viruses compete for replication within hosts and 
transmission between hosts (Park et al., 2013, 
Russell et al., 2012). Developing better phylody-
namic model frameworks (Grenfell et al., 2004) 
for modeling virus host transfer and adaptation 
will require collaboration between theoreticians 
and experimentalists.
Specific goals would be to determine realis-
tic parameters for mutation/selection processes 
(Illingworth et al., 2014) and virus population 
bottlenecks at transmission (Wilker et al., 2013) 
and to generate high-resolution data sets to test 
and train mechanistic models. Such data-driven 
mechanistic models could shed light on addi-
tional constraints to virus genetic change, such 
as fitness valleys that separate virus genotypes 
adapted to one species or another, or conflicts 
in selection acting at different biological scales. 
For example, at the most simple level of under-
standing of the role of receptor binding, avian to 
mammalian host switching is often assumed to 
only require a binary change in receptor specificity 
from α2,3 to α2,6 sialic acid and to be directly 
related to binding affinity. However, in addition to 
the α2,3 and α2,6 linkages, there is a tremendous 
variety in the structures of oligosaccharides dis-
playing the sialic acids and in the structure of the 
sialic acids in different avian hosts (Gambaryan 
et al., 2012, Jourdain et al., 2011). The binding 
specificity for each receptor variant form may 
affect the potential for different viruses to cross 
the species barrier or make the difference between 
causing severe or only mild disease. Rich exper-
imental data sets that provide insights on such 
factors will improve the power of evolutionary 
models to interpret experimental and field data.
Surveillance methodology
Detection of the genetic changes and phenotypes 
of concern relies on systematic characterization 
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of influenza viruses circulating in wild and domes-
ticated animal populations. If there are virus traits 
that correlate with genetic markers observed to 
increase risk in humans, or that can be computa-
tionally inferred from genetic sequence data, it 
could be possible to monitor those markers in 
surveillance and adjust risk assessments prior to 
emergence in humans. However, the acquisition 
of samples entering existing surveillance networks 
is largely ad hoc, exhibits substantial variation by 
host and geographical region, and only a small 
proportion of the data end up in the public domain 
(Figure 3). Making non-human influenza surveil-
lance more systematic by using statistical analysis 
to determine appropriate levels of coverage by 
geographic region and host species would facil-
itate the early detection of viruses of concern 
and also have the potential to facilitate detection 
of evolutionary and epidemiological patterns of 
virus activity that warn of potential emergence 
events.
There are large regions of the world and 
many animal populations for which little or no 
surveillance is performed but where significant 
animal influenza diversity can be inferred to exist. 
Systematic assessments of surveillance by geo-
graphic area and host species, similar to efforts 
for malaria (Gething et al., 2012, 2011, Hay 
et al., 2010, Sinka et al., 2012) and dengue 
(Bhatt et al., 2013), would help to identify major 
gaps where surveillance is either non-existent or 
unlikely to be sufficient for timely detection of 
viruses of concern. For enhancing surveillance, 
prioritizing among these gaps will require sub-
stantial improvements in understanding animal 
host ecology to identify hotspots for virus trans-
mission within and among animal species. Similar 
efforts are required to better understand what 
aspects of the human–animal interface facilitate 
transmission of viruses between animals and 
humans, particularly in animal production and 
domestic animal settings, and the human biolog-
ical and epidemiological factors that promote 
chains of transmission of newly introduced viruses.
One motivation for changing existing surveil-
lance systems is to increase their power to rapidly 
detect changes in patterns of non-human influ-
enza virus activity. Substantial changes, such as 
A
B
Figure 3. Geographic distribution of publicly available influenza virus genetic sequence data in comparison to poultry and swine populations. 
(A) Proportions of worldwide animal population by country (data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).  
(B) Number of unique influenza viruses for which sequence data exists in public databases from poultry or swine by country. Numbers of 
influenza virus sequences are not representative of influenza virus surveillance activities. Information regarding surveillance activities is not 
readily available. Virological surveillance, even if robust, may result in negative findings and is not captured in these figures. Most countries  
do not sequence every influenza virus isolate and some countries conduct virological surveillance without sharing sequence data publicly. 
Sequences deposited in public databases can reflect uneven geographic distribution and interest regarding viruses of concern such as H5N1 
and H9N2.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883.004
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the sudden proliferation of a previously rare virus 
subtype or of a virus with an H9N2 internal gene 
cassette (Gao et al., 2013, GarcÌa-Sastre and 
Schmolke, 2014; Guan et al., 1999), could indi-
cate the emergence of new viral variants in non-
human hosts that should be prioritized for further 
study even before the detection of human infec-
tions of zoonotic origin (Vijaykrishna et al., 2011). 
To be useful from a human health perspective such 
detection systems would require sampling of ani-
mals with no obvious signs of infection, routine 
assessment of particular genetic signatures or full 
genome sequencing, and near real-time sharing 
of these data; these activities all present potential 
financial, political, and logistical constraints.
Further development of surveillance infrastruc-
ture in some geographic locations and host spe-
cies is likely to be unpopular or unfeasible due 
to economic disincentives for disease detection. 
However, the geographic movements of many 
non-human influenza hosts, via migration or trade, 
make it possible to identify surrogate sources 
of information. For example, by linking virological 
and serological data, it has been possible to make 
inferences about swine influenza virus activity in 
some parts of mainland China based only on the 
data from Hong Kong (Strelioff et al., 2013).
A systematic, open, and timely global surveil-
lance system based on viral sequence data would 
be a powerful tool in pandemic risk assessment. 
Viral sequences, with associated metadata and sys-
tematic recording of virus negative sample results, 
provide a rich source of information beyond the 
simple presence or absence of particular strains. 
Phylodynamic reconstructions from even a rela-
tively small number of samples are capable of 
revealing lineages that are proliferating (Grenfell 
et al., 2004, Pybus and Rambaut, 2009). 
Phylogenetic methods can be used to reveal gaps 
in surveillance (Smith et al., 2009, Vijaykrishna 
et al., 2011). Genetic similarity between viruses 
in different locations or host species can identify 
drivers of transmission between populations (Faria 
et al., 2013, Lemey et al., 2014).
Data on negative samples would provide valu-
able denominators for estimating the prevalence 
of infection: tracking infection rates through time 
would give a window into transmission dynamics 
and allow investigation of mechanisms underlying 
virus circulation. The Influenza Research Database 
(IRD) (http://www.fludb.org) includes an animal 
surveillance database that contains negative test 
data but the amount of data is extremely limited 
compared to the global scale of ongoing sur-
veillance activities. Standards should be devel-
oped for consistently recording these relevant 
associated metadata, so that the number of ani-
mals tested, the setting in which sampling took 
place, and the motivation for sampling associ-
ated with genetic data can be submitted in a con-
sistent form to public data repositories, along 
with all sequence submissions.
Conclusions
It is currently not possible to predict which non-
human influenza A virus will cause the next pan-
demic. Reducing the impact of the next pandemic 
will rely on early detection and mitigation strate-
gies that slow the early spread to allow more 
preparatory work to be done. The integration of 
further experimental data with computational 
methods and mathematical models in conjunction 
with refinements to surveillance methodology will 
increase the feasibility of genotype-to-phenotype 
based assessments, increase the power of tools 
for more objectively assessing pandemic risk and 
decrease the time required for assessing the pan-
demic threat posed by extant non-human influ-
enza A viruses—all of which can inform strategies 
to help mitigate the impact of the next pandemic.
Even as risk assessment capabilities improve, 
scientific insights into non-human influenza viruses 
must not give way to complacency that the most 
substantial threats have been identified and char-
acterized. Despite the perceived risks of highly 
pathogenic H5N1 viruses, the emergence of the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic virus in humans, the increas-
ing incidence of human infection with H7N9 
viruses in China since 2013, and the first docu-
mented human infections with H6N1 (Wei et al., 
2013) and H10N8 (Chen et al., 2014) viruses 
highlight the importance of remaining vigilant 
against as-yet unrecognized high-risk viruses 
and the value of surveillance for influenza viruses 
in humans. Beyond further scientific investiga-
tions and refinement of surveillance capacity, the 
development of local surveillance-based outbreak 
response capacity worldwide remains essential. 
The first wave of the 2013 H7N9 outbreak in 
China demonstrated the value of swift coordi-
nated action, including the timely dissemination 
of surveillance data, to limit further incursions of 
new viruses into the human population. Without 
developing similar response capacities in other 
areas at high risk of new virus introductions, we 
are only building expensive systems for watching 
the next pandemic unfold.
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